Under the chairmanship of Dr. President rule reimposed unlawfully by the President after the two months time limit without taking approval of the Parliament under. The State Legislative Assembly should not be dissolved either by the Governor or the President before a Proclamation issued under Article 356 1 has been laid before Parliament and the latter has had an opportunity to consider it. The very election system is thoroughly bad. The act was criticized by the speaker by labeling illegal and unconstitutional. Some of our law makers are interested in politics as it gives them power to make money by hook or crook, or else they will not spend the money on election. Part 18 of the Indian Constitution covers the Emergency Provisions from Article 352 - Article 360.
The duration 'continuance in force' of a Proclamation of Emergency under Article 356 3 and 4 is two months unless approved by resolutions of both Houses of Parliament, and would still cease to be in operation after a period of six months from the date of the last resolution. In case both Houses of Parliament disapprove or do not approve the Proclamation, the Proclamation lapses at the end of the two-month period. There is a need for a law which should consider non-performance by States as something to be held accountable. Assembly kept in suspended animation. The Supreme Court in this matter observed, inter alia, that it should not hesitate to perform its constitutional duty merely because it involves considering political issues.
This aspect is a combination of other aspects and adds a qualifier, viz. Thereupon the President makes a 'Proclamation of Emergency,' dismissing the State Legislature and Executive. Poh-Ling Tan, supra note 55. Though the power of the President under Article 356 concerns his political judgment and the courts usually avoid entering the political thicket, this power does not enjoy blanket immunity from judicial review. This trend had a sharp increase after 1967 onwards when monopoly of congress rule in centre and states was broken.
The circumstances preceding this Proclamation - the Union or Central leadership suspending a State Government where it is not able to impose leadership aligned to it - is reminiscent of the Proclamation of Emergency in the State of Uttar Pradesh, in India, which will be discussed in more detail in the next section. It may happen that while defending the Proclamation, the Minister or the official concerned may claim the privilege under Section 123. It is not an absolute power. Article 356 of the Constitution of India should be seen in a new progressive light. The recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission with respect to the exercise of power under Article 356 do merit serious consideration at the hands of all concerned. During a state of emergency, the President is vested with tremendous discretionary powers. To get elected to the Parliament one needs a lot of money.
The advantage in the American instance is obvious; it gives the President wider latitude in mobilizing the whole country to deal with an emergency situation in one part. There is a need for a law which should consider non-performance by States as something to be held accountable. The Commission, headed by Justice R. The present Constitution, however, does not intend to suspend the Constitution of a State, but empowers the President to take steps in this regard, though he shall have to act on the report of the Governor or Ruler of the State. Minerva Mills and Others v.
Babasaheb Ambedkar then pacified the members stating: 'In fact I share the sentiments expressed by my Hon'ble friend Mr. Ambedkar, it was to prepare a draft Constitution for India. According to the Commission's report, these alternatives may be dispensed with only in cases of extreme emergency, where failure on the part of the Union to take immediate action under Article 356 would lead to disastrous consequences. Before taking action under Article 356, any explanation received from the State should be taken into account. Are these figures not enough to compel the Government to take action under articles 355 and 356? Till date the position regarding the two elements have not been clearly laid down, this has opened them for debates and criticisms. Each branch had specific powers while also having the ability to check the powers of the other two branches. While at the University of Pune, Joy researched Constitutional Emergencies.
The machinery of government does not ordinarily fail if this or that provision of the constitution is violated by the acts of the state. In the course of about two years, the Assembly discussed 2,473 amendments out of a total of 7,635 amendments tabled. Another major difference is that presidential satisfaction as to the existence of a situation of emergency is not entirely exempt from judicial review under the Indian Constitution, as was pointed out above, whereas satisfaction of the Yang di Pertuan Agong enjoys a high degree of immunity from judicial review under Article 150 8 a of the Malaysian Constitution. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least, as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility. It is desirable that the law makers should be political philosophers of repute who may be invited to seek election but the government should meet their expenses.
This situation was in contrast to the provisions of Article 356 3 and 4 of the Indian Constitution, which stipulates checks and balances against the potential of prolonged impositions of arbitrary powers of discretion of the Executive. Now, Article 174 of Indian Constitution reads, 1 The Governor shall from time to time summon the House or each House of the Legislature of the State to meet at such time and place as he thinks fit, but six months shall not intervene between its last sitting in one session and the date appointed for its first sitting in the next session. In 1934, a Supreme Court ruling defined an emergency as 'urgency and relative infrequency of occurrence as well as equivalence to a public calamity resulting from fire, flood, or like disaster not reasonably subject to anticipation. Subsequent pronouncements by the Supreme Court in Jharkhand and other states have further limited the scope for misuse of Article 356. The holding of assembly sessions is very important, and if it does not take place after a continuous warning, then it is a serious violation of constitutional provisions. Emergency In Arunachal Pradesh: Valid Or Not? The Act in essence returned all standby emergency powers to dormancy two years after the Statute's approval.